A risky design equilibrium problem is an equilibrium system that involves N designers who invest in risky assets, such as production plants, evaluate these using convex or coherent risk measures, and also trade financial securities in order to manage their risk. Our main finding is that in a complete risk market-when all uncertainties can be replicated by financial products-a risky design equilibrium problem collapses to what we call a risky design game, i.e., a stochastic Nash game in which the original design agents act as risk neutral and there emerges an additional system risk agent. The system risk agent simultaneously prices risk and determines the probability density used by the other agents for their risk neutral evaluations. This situation is stochastic-endogenous: the probability density used by agents to value uncertain investments is endogenous to the risky design equilibrium problem. This result is most striking when design agents use coherent risk measures in which case the intersection of their risk sets turns out to be a risk set for the system risk agent, thereby extending existing results for risk markets. We also investigate existence of equilibria in both the complete and incomplete cases.
as represented by a vector W i ∈ Z. Given the price of risk P r in the dual space of Z, the cost of W i is defined by the dual action P r [W i ] ∈ R. Hence agent i optimizes with respect to both design and hedging variables, (2) min
Recall the classical risk market [1] in which each agent i has a risky cost Z i ∈ Z, e.g., Z i = Ξ i (x i , x −i ) for fixed x i and x −i , and is given the price of risk P r . Agent i hedges Z i by solving (3) min
The price of risk P r is determined by the equilibrium condition that all trades of financial products balance each other:
This describes a complete risk market, i.e., when W i can be any member of Z. Definition 1. The risky design equilibrium problem 1 is the system that combines (2) (for i = 1, . . . , N) and (4) . A risky design equilibrium is a solution of this system that comprises design variables x ↑ , risk trades W ↑ , and a price of risk P r . A risky design equilibrium problem combines a risk averse Nash game in design variables x ↑ := (x i ) N i=1 with a (complete) market in risk. Incomplete risky design equilibrium problems, where risk trades W i are constrained to lie in a closed subspace of Z, are addressed in section 4.
Our main contribution is to build a bridge between the risky design equilibrium problem (2) , (4) and the risk neutral design game (1), which we do by introducing a risky design game as we now describe. The most striking case is when each r i is a coherent risk measure (CRM) [2] , hence r i (Z) = max{E Π [Z] : Π ∈ D i } for some nonempty, closed, convex set of probability densities D i called its risk set. This is a worst-case appraisal of the cost of Z over all Π ∈ D i . Let D 0 be the intersection N i=1 D i , the system risk set (see Definition 4 in section 2.2.1). Nonemptiness of D 0 can be assumed since this is necessary for existence of a risk market equilibrium (see part 2 of Theorem 4, section 2.2.1). We reformulate the risky design equilibrium problem as a game combining the risk neutral design game (1) , over N players, with an N + 1 st agent, the system risk agent, that sets the probability density Π by solving
That is, the system risk agent evaluates the system CRM whose risk set is D 0 . The combination of (1) and (5) exemplifies the risky design game mentioned above. See Definition 5 in section 3.3 for the more general case when agents use convex risk measures. so that payoffs are endogenous, and considers an incomplete risk market that yields a generalized Nash equilibrium.
While our model is an extension of partial equilibrium models found in the literature, it can also be seen as a simplification of the generalization of general equilibrium models to stochastic models of physical and financial assets. An in-depth analysis of the economic work in that area can be found in [23] . The paper [21] presents a mathematical programming-based analysis of these questions. Our model works in a simpler context but it may be useful to briefly note some relations between the two areas. In contrast with stochastic general equilibrium (SGE) problems, we neglect the consumer side because of the complexity in SGE problems introduced by two-stage budget constraints. We also state our problem in a Nash equilibrium set-up which avoids the complication of pricing physical assets (we only deal with the prices of the financial assets). Our model is thus a pure production model; an extension that embeds a consumer with constant marginal utility of money (hence still avoiding the complexity of the intertemporal budget constraint) and explicitly deals with the prices of the physical assets is in preparation.
Although our main results pertain to complete markets, a treatment of incomplete markets, as in the SGE case, is closer to reality. In an incomplete market the space of revenue from the physical market cannot be spanned by the financial products (which is typical in electricity markets) and hence where a standard nonarbitrage condition leads to a multiplicity of prices. In the language of SGE models [23] , we consider equilibrium in "constrained equilibrium allocation," i.e., in the space of financial transfers spanned by existing instruments, and show existence of an equilibrium in terms of risk adjusted evaluation of profits, taking into account the variety of prices. A final note is that although Pareto optimality is an ever-present topic in economics, from welfare theory through to recent work on financial markets, the question of Pareto optimality for these equilibria is left for further research.
Notation.
Simple finite dimensional case. Let R denote the set of real numbers, R + := [0, ∞), R ∞ := R ∪ {∞}. We will identify each future scenario or state ω with a future cost, e.g., Z ω ∈ R, and also identify probability density functions on the set Ω of all scenarios. For example, if Ω = {1, . . . , K}, then Z = R K , so that an uncertain outcome Z ∈ Z represents K cost scenarios, and the set of probability densities P is defined as the set of vectors in R K with nonnegative entries that sum to 1. The usual dot or inner product between any vectors ζ and
We also introduce ½ as the vector of ones in Z, and the comparison
Z 2 between vectors in Z to mean that Z 1ω ≤ Z 2ω for each ω. This allows us to write P in dual form as those ζ ∈ R K such that ζ[Z] ≥ 0 for all Z 0 and ζ[½] = 1. We usually denote a probability density by Π and write its dual action as an expectation:
We write a list of uncertain outcomes, one for each agent, as
. Thus Z ↑ belongs to Z N , which is the Cartesian product of N copies of Z. Likewise, when we introduce financial products in section 2.1.2, we will write
n , the inner product is denoted v x (we use different notation from that of the inner product on Z, to avoid confusing R n with Z.) For a set D ⊂ R n recall that its tangent cone at a point x ∈ D, written T D (x), is the set of points of the form lim( L p spaces and uncertain outcome spaces. To allow for an infinite number of scenarios we need more notational tools. Adapting [31] , let (Ω, F , μ) be a measure space that is nonnegative, nontrivial, and finite, i.e., the measure of sets S in F satisfies μ(S) ≥ 0 and, in particular, 0 < μ(Ω) < ∞.
2 (The prototype such measure space is the real interval [0,1] under Lebesgue measure.) Henceforth measurable means F -measurable, and the measure of a set is taken with respect to μ.
for short, be the space of measurable
The space L ∞ (Ω, F , μ) is defined similarly with f ∞ := inf{sup ω∈Ω\S |f (ω)| : S has measure zero in Ω}. We usually emphasize the vector view by referring to members of L p (Ω, F , μ) in the form Z = (Z ω ) ω∈Ω rather than as functions on Ω and may write Z rather than Z p when the context is clear. These L p spaces are Banach spaces that, as a consequence of the finite measure of Ω, are contained in More general spaces of uncertain outcomes are discussed in [31, 33] . Nevertheless L p spaces are quite rich and we prefer ease of presentation to greater generality.
There is a natural ordering of uncertain outcomes Z 1 , Z 2 ∈ Z: Z 1 Z 2 denotes Z 1ω ≤ Z 2ω for almost all (a.a.) ω ∈ Ω, where a.a. ω means either all ω ∈ Ω if Ω = {1, . . . , K} or all ω except those in a measure zero subset of Ω if Ω is a more general measure space. Likewise a.e. means for a.a. ω.
The dual space Z * and set of probability densities P.
. Analogous to probability densities on R K , we define P as the set of dual elements g
dμ(ω) = 1, and observe that the uniform distribution ½/μ(Ω) lies in P when Z is an L p space.
The toolbox of risk markets and risk measures.
Here we gather and recast results from a number of papers in the finance literature, including [1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18] , to provide tools for complete and perfectly competitive risk markets; these and other papers will be highlighted in the material to follow. Section 2.1 introduces risk markets, where agents use convex functions to assess uncertainty and trade financial products to hedge risk. The important results for us are that the existence of a risk (market) equilibrium is equivalent to solving a system risk optimization problem that follows as (6) ; that the optimal value of this system risk problem can be written as an inf-convolution v r , defined by (7), that we call the system risk function; and, when a risk equilibrium price P r exists, that the price of risk is characterized as a subgradient of v r . Section 2.2 specializes risk markets to the case of (convex) risk measures and CRMs. An important first result is that the subgradients of these functions are probability densities. Next, when each r i is a risk measure, the system risk function v r is also a risk measure; hence, when a risk equilibrium exists, P r is a probability density. The situation is particularly striking when each r i is a CRM, for then v r is a CRM whose risk set can be characterized as the intersection of the risk sets of all N agents.
The toolbox is concluded in section 2.3, which presents various sufficient conditions for existence of risk equilibria. Agent i has its own risk function, r i : Z → R, that is convex. (In section 2.2 we will introduce further axioms to define risk measures.) Agent i knows each payoff Z iω with certainty, but is not sure which of these cost outcomes, i.e., which scenario ω, will occur in the future. Agents want to minimize cost or, equivalently, maximize profit, which is taken to be synonymous with negative cost.
Consider a continuous convex function r : Z → R where Z is a Banach space. Note that r is subdifferentiable at any Z ∈ Z, the latter meaning that the subdifferential defined below is nonempty:
Moreover, the subdifferential is also locally bounded near any Z ∈ Z; these results, which we will use without reference, can be found in [30 
Recall the risk market given by (3) for each W i and (4) for the P r . Our first result, essentially due to [1] , states that the equivalence between perfectly competitive trading and system optimization "is a trivial reformulation of the usual one in welfare economics" given by [32, Chapter VIII] . This adapts the classical paradigm of perfect competition from goods and services to risk, i.e., each agent sets its consumption level (of financial products W i ) to balance its marginal risk reduction against the unit prices (P r ) of those products. (6) min
and P r is the Lagrange multiplier of trade balance constraint.
is nonempty, and P r is a member of this intersection. The equivalence between statements 1 and 2 is classical economics [32] and is immediately derived by examining the stationary conditions [30] for the convex optimization problems that are involved. The equivalence between statements 1 and 3 is elementary and also follows easily from stationary conditions without resorting to Lagrange multipliers (or checking a regularity condition on the constraints) by defining
We introduce the system risk function of the consolidated or aggregate portfolio
This is a classical inf convolution of the functions r i and is therefore convex when each r i is convex [29] . Note that v r i Z i is the infimal value (or optimal value if a solution exists) of (6) . The theory of inf convolutions is used later in section 2.3 when discussing existence of a solution to (7) .
Our next result is extracted and restated from [10] .
Theorem 2 (see [10, section 3.2]). Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, if a risk market equilibrium exists for a given list Z ↑ ∈ Z
N of agents' endowments, then the following are equivalent:
Introduction to risk measures. Recall the notation
Definition 3 (risk measures). Let Z be an uncertain outcome space, r : Z → R, and consider the following properties:
We say r is a (convex) risk measure [16] if it satisfies axioms 1-3 and is a CRM [2] if it additionally satisfies axiom 4.
We note that [5, 6, 31, 33] all provide bridges between the finance and optimization approaches to risk measures though the optimized certainty equivalent of [5] was defined prior to the coining of the terms convex and CRMs.
We list some properties of risk measures that we will use without reference below. Theorem 3. Let Z be an uncertain outcome space and r : Z → R. We study N agents (e.g., investors in production plants) where agent i is endowed with an uncertain cost vector Z i = (Z iω ) ω∈Ω (e.g., the cost of production tomorrow), and each ω indexes a future scenario (e.g., relating to cost of inputs or price of output). Agents are risk averse and exchange financial securities to reduce their risk.
We introduce a CRM to characterize system risk when all agents use CRMs. Definition 4 (system CRM). Let Z be an uncertain outcome space. For each agent i = 1, . . . , N, let r i : Z → R be a CRM and denote its (nonempty, convex, and closed) risk set as D i ⊂ P. Define the system risk set as
and the system CRM as the CRM with the risk set D 0 :
We say r 0 describes the risk aversion of a system agent that is the least risk averse or most risk neutral of all agents. The term "least risk averse" reflects the weakly lower cost of uncertainty faced by the system agent than by any other agent due to the containment of
The next result shows that the system risk function inherits the risk measure properties of the individual risk functions r i . Part 2 is freely adapted from the references cited there. 
Existence of risk equilibria under risk measures.
We give some conditions under which risk can be priced. The case of risk measures is treated in Theorem 5, followed by a brief review of some important related results in the financial mathematics literature. The case of existence under CRMs follows immediately as Corollary 1.
We recall two well known classes of extended real valued convex functions f : Z → R ∞ . We say f is polyhedral convex if its epigraph is the intersection of finitely many closed half spaces in Z ×R. We say f is law invariant if 
We'll need some additional notation. First, the convex conjugate of f :
Second, the domain of f * is dom f * := {ζ ∈ Z * : f * (ζ) < ∞}. Third, the strong quasi-relative interior of a set S in Z * , sqri(S), is the set of ζ 0 ∈ S such that the cone It relies on the property of a linear program-in this case a reformulation of (6)-that the problem has a solution when it is feasible and bounded below.
The sqri condition in statement 2 is motivated by [18] , which studies risk markets with finitely many contingencies (Z = R K ) and, hence, uses the equivalent notion of relative interior, rint [29] , rather than sqri. Nonemptiness of i rint (dom r * i ) is shown [18, Proposition 4.2] to be equivalent to the existence of risk trades W ↑ that are balanced such that the adjusted list of assets Z ↑ − W ↑ satisfies a kind of Pareto optimality given by [18, Definition 3.1] . It is shown in [10] that this condition is sufficient for existence of a risk equilibrium; see Theorem 3.1, which has a Pareto optimality framing, and the connection to both system optimization and the system risk function v r in section 3.2 of that paper. Proof of Theorem 5. As already mentioned, we only need to prove sufficiency of statements 1 and 2. Rather than dealing with an equilibrium in the risk market, we use its characterization as a solution of the system optimization problem (6); see Theorem 1.
Assume statement 1. In this case (6) can be written as a linear program whose feasible set is nonempty. We will show that nonemptiness of i dom r * i implies that the objective function of (6), hence of its linear programming reformulation, is bounded below on its feasible set. Since a feasible linear program that is bounded has a solution, even in infinite dimensions, the result follows.
By hypothesis, r i (Z), for any Z ∈ Z, can be written as the minimum value of α such that α ≥ α 
Assume statement 2. Existence of solutions of inf convolutions, sometimes called exactness, is a very well studied problem in convex analysis and we appeal here to the standard result [3] . Given a Banach space X and convex, lower semicontinuous mappings f 1 , f 2 : X → R ∞ , this result says for any x 0 ∈ X that the inf convolution inf x1,x2∈X {f * 
is achieved as a minimum. That is, there exists a solution of (7) and hence of the system risk problem (6) .
An 
3. Risky design equilibrium problems and risky design games. We extend the framework of a risk market to risky design equilibrium problems and then Nash games. Section 3.1 models our risky design equilibrium problem along with the risk, convexity, and technical assumptions that are needed for later results. Section 3.2 gives a chain rule, Theorem 6, that is used to formulate the stationary conditions of design agents. Section 3.3 contains our main result, Theorem 8, which shows how a risky design equilibrium problem, where agents use risk measures, can be reformulated Downloaded 01/05/16 to 131.111.184.102. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php as a risky design game given in Definition 5. In the latter, design agents act as risk neutral with respect to a probability density defined by an emergent system risk agent, which shows stochastic-endogeneity of these systems. Theorem 8 also shows existence of a risky design equilibrium under reasonable conditions. Corollary 2 specializes this to the case of CRMs.
In this section and section 4 to follow, we restrict L p spaces to those with 1 ≤ p < ∞. The exclusion of p = ∞ is a limitation in the chain rule, Theorem 6.
Risky design equilibria and modeling assumptions.
and its strategy is determined by solving
In fact I i can depend on x −i and also can be absorbed, by translation invariance,
. So we will notionally simplify agent i's problem, without loss of modeling generality, to
This constitutes a noncooperative Nash game, over agents i = 1, . . . , N, which is a game theoretic extension of risk averse optimization [31] . We follow the introduction by including risk trading and restating (2) and (4) below. Given the price of risk P r on Z, the ith agent finds x i ∈ R n and W i ∈ Z to solve (11) min
Also, risk trades must be balanced:
Applying Definition 1, the system (11) (for i = 1, . . . , N) and (12) is a risky design equilibrium problem. Our goal is to extend the existence theory for Nash games under risk to the new paradigm of risky design equilibrium problems. Our assumptions follow. For each i = 1, . . . , N let X i be a nonempty compact convex set in R n , 
. Note that these assumptions are sufficient for existence of a solution of the Nash game (10), e.g., convexity of r i Ξ i (·, x −i ) follows from convexity of each Ξ iω (·, x −i ) given monotonicity of r i [31] , and
For clarity we state Nash's theorem as Theorem 14 in the appendix, where, in keeping with the original statement [24] , agent i's objective function is required to be quasi-convex in its strategy x i . In this paper, we unavoidably require convexity in x i in order to use equivalence between stationarity and global optimality.
Chain rule.
Here we provide tools to derive the stationary conditions of each agent's optimization problem. Hence we consider a single agent only, omit the index i, and modify and extend results developed for optimization under risk in [31, 33] .
Let ρ denote the composite function r • Ξ(x) := r Ξ(x) , where r : Z → R is a risk measure, each Ξ ω : R n → R ∞ is lower semicontinuous and convex with the same domain D, and ρ takes the value ∞ outside D. If we are minimizing ρ, then we would like to formulate stationary conditions using gradients or subgradients of ρ via a chain rule, Theorem 6 below, which will be used in section 3.3. To clarify what is needed, we mention a result which follows from classical finite dimensional convex analysis [29] . If Z = R K ,x ∈ D,Z = Ξ(x), and each Ξ ω is subdifferentiable atx, then we have the chain rule
. × ∂Ξ K (x). The fact that ∂r(Z) consists of probability densities allows us to rewrite this as ∂ρ(x) = E Π [ξ] : Π ∈ ∂r(Z), ξ ∈ ∂Ξ(x)
. We need to extend this chain rule by allowing, first, risk trading, i.e., composite functions which map (x, W ) ∈ R n ×Z to r(Ξ(x)−W ), and, second, infinite dimensional uncertainties, Z = L p (Ω).
We give a chain rule that combines and extends two results given in [31] , namely, a chain rule Theorem 6.11 and disintegration result Theorem 7.47. We depart from the former by studying compositions that may take the value ∞ and by showing closedness of the set on the right-hand side of the subdifferential formula (14) , below. 
The composition ρ is convex and lower semicontinuous and its domain is D × Z. 2. Suppose in addition thatx ∈ D is such that there exists the
where
Due to the highly technical nature of the proof, we postpone it to the appendix. Note that, in the situation of Theorem 6, a sufficient condition for the directional differentiability property of Ξ required in part 2 is thatx lies in rint D [33, Theorem 7 .44].
3.3.
Reformulation of a risky design equilibrium problem as a Nash game.
A link to risk neutral Nash games via stochastic-endogeneity.
Recall the system risk function v r (see (7) i = 1, . . . , N) are standard risk neutral optimizers, (16) , and there is a final equilibrium condition, (17) , that determines the risk neutral probability density. Hence this format is a stochastic-endogenous equilibrium problem. We contrast this with the more traditional stochastic game in which (17) is dropped in favor of a fixed probability density Π, given in advance, that results in a risk neutral Nash game (16) .
Then A ⇒ B, and the converse holds (for appropriate W ↑ ) if the risk market has an equilibrium when each agent i holds the asset
Proof of Theorem 7. Extend Ξ iω (x i , x −i ) to take the value +∞ for x ↑ ∈ X ↑ , and
Then the stationary condition of (11) can be formulated as 0 ∈ (0, P r ) + ∂ρ i (x i , W i ), which, by the chain rule Theorem 6, gives,
This shows that P r is independent of i, and we simplify the conditions to
is a risky design Nash equilibrium so that (18) holds with P r = Π. Obviously W ↑ and Π form a risk equilibrium for the risky assets
. . , N, and hence Theorem 2 gives (17) . Also, the first inclusion of (18) is stationarity of (16) by the chain rule Theorem 6, i.e., x i solves this convex problem.
Conversely take x ↑ , Π that solve (16), (17) . We have seen that the stationary condition of (16) is the first inclusion of (18) . Assuming further that there exists a risk equilibrium given Z i = Ξ i (x i , x −i ) for each i, Theorem 2 ensures that Π prices risk for Z ↑ . Let W ↑ be the equilibrium risk trades. Hence, by Theorem 1, the second inclusion of (18) holds for each i when P r = Π. Thus we have solved (11) . Since W ↑ must also be balanced we are done.
A risky design equilibrium problem is equivalent to a Nash game.
Recall the convex conjugate of v r , the function v r * :
A standard result of convex conjugacy for lower semicontinuous convex functions like v r is that ζ ∈ ∂v r (Z) if and only if Z ∈ ∂v r * (ζ); see [29, Corollary 12A] . Thus the inclusion (17) 
There is no generality lost in restricting the decision set of this problem to the domain of v r * . Likewise, since any stationary point Π is a subgradient of the risk measure v r , it is a probability density. Hence if D r denotes domain of v r * ,
we consider
which is equivalent to (17) but has the form required for an agent in a Nash game. In fact (19) can be viewed as an N + 1st agent that prices risk, the so-called system risk agent. We summarize as follows: The risky design equilibrium problem (11) (for i = 1, . . . , N) and (12) , Π). Part 1 is already proved above. In finite dimensions, existence in part 2 is evidently a direct application of Nash's theorem because D r inherits compactness from its superset P. A complicating factor when Z = L p (Ω) is that the dual elements lie in Z * = L q (Ω) and, consequently, we lack norm compactness of the closed convex set P. This is overcome by using the weak * topology on Z * , under which P is weak * compact. Proof of Theorem 8. As noted above, we only need to prove part 2. This is an application of Nash's theorem, stated as theorem 14 in the appendix, to the game with N + 1 agents given by (16) for i = 1, . . . , N, and (19) for i = N + 1. As well as the norm, or strong, topology on Z * we need to consider the weak * topology on Z * . We need the standard result (Alaoglu's theorem, or see [28, Chapter III.7, Theorem 6]) that weak * compactness holds for every set in Z * that is closed and bounded with respect to the usual (dual) norm on Z * . By the product topology we mean the topology on R nN × Z * whose neighborhoods are Cartesian products of neighborhoods in R n and weak * neighborhoods in Z * . We list the immediate properties of the game: Each agent i = 1, . . . , N has a strategy set X i that is nonempty convex and compact (in R n ) and an objective E Π Ξ i (x i , x −i ) that is continuous and convex in x i given (x i , Π) and is also continuous in all variables (x i , x −i , Π) with respect to the product topology. The last statement Downloaded 01/05/16 to 131.111.184.102. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php relies on continuity of Ξ i as a mapping from the normed space R nN to the normed space Z. Agent N + 1 has as its strategy set the domain D r of the conjugate v r * of the system risk function, and D r is convex and closed (by hypothesis) but not weak * compact because it is not in general bounded; we'll return to this later. Its objective function Φ(Π,
is the sum of a convex function and a linear function of Π and hence is convex in Π. To show that Φ is lower semicontinuous in (Π, x ↑ ), we start by observing that the first term v r * , being a convex conjugate, is automatically weak * lower semicontinuous on Z * . 8 The second (expectation) term is actually continuous in the product topology due to continuity of v r and norm continuity of each Ξ i . It follows that Φ is both lower semicontinuous (in the product topology) and continuous in x ↑ only.
To apply Nash's theorem it is only left to show that the risk pricing problem (19) can be written as optimization over a convex weak * compact set. Recall from previous discussion that Π lies in ∂v r (
of the compact set X ↑ . Combining these two facts gives norm boundedness of the set
Let D be the closed convex hull of this set, which is a weak * compact subset of D r since the latter is closed by hypothesis. Thus for any x ↑ ∈ X ↑ , the strategy set D r of (19) can replaced by D without changing the set of optimal solutions.
An immediate corollary is for the case when all agents use CRMs r i = σ Di and hence from Theorem 4, v r = σ D0 , where
It is elementary that the convex conjugate of σ D0 takes the value 0 when Π ∈ D 0 and ∞ otherwise, hence D r = D 0 , which is a closed set, and the system risk agent's problem (19) reduces to (20) max
Both parts of the next result also rely on sufficient conditions for existence of risk equilibria given by Corollary 1 in section 2.3.
Corollary 2. In the situation of Theorem 8, suppose that all agents use CRMs as in Definition 4 and the system risk set
If either each risk set D i is polyhedral and convex or the system risk set has interior relative to P, then 1. the risky design equilibrium problem (11) , (12) is equivalent to the risky design game (16) , (20); 2. an equilibrium exists for each of these systems. Remark 2. A key point regarding existence of equilibria is that we are merely exercising long established ideas and that standard extensions or elaborations are equally possible. One extension asks when boundedness of the strategy sets X i can be dispensed with. If we can show that equilibria, should they exist, lie in a bounded set, then the original proof holds trivially. (This idea is exemplified in the proof of Theorem 8, part 2 in the appendix.) A more subtle approach imposes conditions on the variational inequality that is formed by writing all agents' stationary conditions in one system; see [13, Chapter 2] or [17, section 7] . The direct analysis of the equilibrium conditions may prove challenging since the associated variational inequality problem has expectation-valued maps. Consequently, sufficiency conditions for existence are by no means easy to ascertain, though some recent work [27] may assist with respect to coercivity. Sufficiency conditions are a topic for further work.
4. Incomplete risky design equilibrium problems. Our final section takes an introductory look at risky design problems when the risk market is incomplete. Suppose risk trades are confined to a closed subspace W of Z, which is natural in financial markets where there are several kinds of financial securities that define the basis of W. This is the case in [22] , which, however, confines itself to financial trades to study hedging.
Adapting from the complete case (2) or (11), given x −i and P r , agent i solves
The price of risk P r is a dual element in W * (since it only acts on W). [15] ); Theorem 11, which shows-analogous to Theorem 7-how an incomplete risky design equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a combination of a risk neutral design game and a risk pricing process; and Theorem 12-analogous to Corollary 2-which gives sufficient conditions for existence of an incomplete risky design equilibrium when there are only finitely many stochastic scenarios and agents use CRMs.
Theorems 11 and 12 show the stochastic-endogenous nature of incomplete risky design equilibria but differ fundamentally from the case of complete markets in that each design agent may select a different probability density or marginal price of risk (see Definition 7).
Review of incomplete risk markets.
Suppose there are N agents with risky assets Z 1 , . . . , Z N ∈ Z. In the risk market, given P r , agent i faces the problem
As above, P r ∈ W * is such that, at equilibrium, W ↑ is balanced. We give a straightforward extension of Theorem 2. Denote by Π ↑ the list of probability densities ( 
and P r is the Lagrange multiplier of the trade balance constraint. 3. W ↑ is balanced and P r is such that
A proof isn't needed as it is more or less the same as in the complete case: As in Theorem 1, the equivalence between statements 1 and 2 is classical economics, and the equivalence between all statements can be directly derived by looking at the stationary conditions of the convex optimization problems that are involved.
When investigating existence later we will assume agent risk preferences are represented by CRMs. The next result is a direct extension of Corollary 1 to the incomplete case. 
4.2.
Reformulation and existence of solutions of incomplete risky design equilibrium problems. Recall the risk neutral design problem (1) or (16) that we adapt here to account for different probability densities Π i :
We couple this with a risk market characterization derived from statement 3 of Theorem 9. 
Theorem 11. In the setting of Theorem 9, let
is an incomplete risky design equilibrium if and only if x ↑ solves the risk neutral Nash design equilibrium (23) , where Π ↑ is a marginal risk equilibrium for Z ↑ = Ξ ↑ (x ↑ ) and P r = Π i | W for any i.
Proof.
Following the proof of Theorem 7 we extend Ξ iω (x i , x −i ) to take the value +∞ for 
Thus if (x ↑ , W ↑ , P r ) is an incomplete risky design equilibrium then x i solves (23) for each i, (24) holds, and i W i = 0. The converse follows with the help of Theorem 9.
Theorem 11 puts the incomplete risky design equilibrium problem into a form suitable for application of Kakutani's fixed point theorem, stated as Theorem 13 in the appendix. This leads to our final existence result, which is limited to finite dimensions.
As in [22] , we need an interiority condition on Proof.
) be the set of optimal solutions x i of (23) which is nonempty, compact, and convex.
Given x ↑ ∈ X ↑ , consider the risk market corresponding to risky assets
for each i, we appeal to statement 2 of Theorem 10 to get a risk equilibrium corresponding to Z ↑ . Hence there exists a marginal risk equilibrium Π ↑ for Z ↑ from statement 3 of Theorem 9. Let Φ N +1 (x ↑ ) be the set of such Π ↑ . Then Φ N +1 (x ↑ ) is a nonempty, convex, and compact set in D ↑ which denotes the Cartesian product
defines a set mapping from the nonempty compact convex set X ↑ ×D ↑ to nonempty convex compact subsets of X ↑ × D ↑ . If the graph of this set mapping is closed, then Kakutani's fixed point theorem, reproduced in the appendix as Theorem 13, gives a fixed point (x ↑ ,Π ↑ ). That is,x ↑ solves the Nash game (23) andΠ ↑ is a marginal risk equilibrium for Ξ i (x i ,x −i ) i . In this case, Theorem 11 completes the proof.
To show that the graph of Φ is closed, suppose (x Combining (25) and (26) (29) where (27) moves x inside the integral that defines E Πν [ξ ν ]; the inequality (28) relies a.e. on having Π νω ≥ 0, the inequality ξ ων x ≤ σ ∂Ξω (x) (x) (since ξ νω ∈ ∂Ξ ω (x)), and σ ∂Ξω (x) (x) = Ξ ω (x; x) (Lemma 1, part 2); and in (29) , the first equality is due to weak * convergence of {Π ν }, while the final inequality is from (25) . Lemma Kakutani's and Nash's theorems. Combining the usual norm topology on R nN with the weak * topology on Z * will allow us to apply the following infinite dimensional fixed point theorem to the Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space R nN × Z * . Theorem 13 is obtained from [19, p. 186] , in which the closed graph property is replaced by upper semicontinuity, by noting that in Hausdorff (or separated) topological spaces, a set-valued mapping is upper semicontinuous if (and only if) it has a closed graph.
Theorem 13 (Kakutani
Given Theorem 13 we state the corresponding infinite dimensional version of Nash's theorem [24] whose proof is identical to the original. We specify topological properties of the objective function f i that were not mentioned in the original, however.
Theorem 14 (Nash) . For i = 1, . . . , N 
